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I. INTRODUCTION

The international joint venture' is a rapidly developing2 form
of business organization.3 As markets became increasingly global
in the 1970s and 1980s, and as artificial political barriers have

begun to fall in the 1990s, transnational business activity has accelerated. 4 With this process, collaborative arrangements among existing businesses have become very popular,5 both domestically and

internationally.6
Increasing numbers of parent companies that develop international joint ventures tend to be motivated by one or more of a
consistent set of goals. Some ventures are created in order to pro-

vide entry into a host country that restricts, or once restricted,7
direct foreign investment ("DFI").' Countries moving toward more
1. The terms "joint venture" and "strategic alliance" are often used interchangeably.
Some consider the joint venture a particular form of strategic alliance, with the latter
category considered to also include non-organizational forms of collaboration. Because the
term strategic alliance has more varying interpretations than the term joint venture, I shall
limit its use in this text.
For a general discussion of international joint ventures, see Dorothy B. Christelow,
International Joint Ventures: How Important Are They?, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Spring
1987, at 7; J. Peter Killmg, How to Make a Global Joint Venture Work, HARv. Bus.
REV., May-June 1982, at 120.

2. The formation of joint ventures between American companies and international coventurers has increased at an annual rate of twenty-seven percent since 1985. Stratford
Sherman, Are Strategic Alliances Working?, FORTUNE, Sept. 21, 1992, at 77, 77.
3. While there are many definitions of joint ventures, efforts to distinguish joint ventures from partnerships and corporations have not been fruitful and have often been confusing. A joint venture will be either a partnership or a corporation, depending on the
desires of the parent companies. Whether partnership or incorporation is chosen, the resulting entity is a joint venture if it represents the collaborative efforts of two or more existing businesses united for short- or long-term purposes.
4. See The Global 1000, Bus. WK., July 13, 1992, at 50, 53-108 (ranking the one
thousand largest companies in the world by market value, reflecting business expansion
into a wide range of countries, predominantly in North America, Europe, and Asia).
5. For a discussion of the attractiveness of joint ventures in global markets, see Michael P. Lyons, Joint-Ventures as Strategic Choice, 24 LoNG RANGE PLAN. 130 (1991).
6. For the purposes of this article, a joint venture will be considered "international"
when the predominant national affiliations of the parent companies are not identical.
7. While we tend to think of socialist and formerly socialist countries as being in
these categories, restrictions on foreign investment have been implemented in capitalist
countries as well. For example, direct foreign investment in Japan was relatively restricted
until the 1960's but was gradually liberalized through the 1970's and 1980's. For a discussion of the history of foreign investment in Japan, see Zenichi Shishido, Problems of
International Joint Ventures in Japan, 26 INT'L LAw. 65, 66-68 (1992). Likewise, Mexico
has traditionally barred foreign corporations from operating wholly owned subsidiaries
within its borders. For a discussion of the use of joint ventures as part of a strategy for
entering Mexico and Japan, see JOHN GARLAND ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DIMENsIONS OF
Busnqss PoLicY AND STRATEGY 100 (2d ed. 1990).
8. For a discussion of different types of foreign market entry strategies, see Ming-Je
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open economies are able to do so gradually and securely by restricting DFI to situations in which the foreign corporation enters
an equity joint venture with a domestic partner.9 Even in countries

that do not require a degree of local ownership in foreign investments, ° the use of a joint venture may expedite entry into foreign
markets because of opportunities to utilize a host country firm's
existing labor, operations, and marketing structures." Transnational
joint ventures are especially promising in countries like Mexico,
which are currently negotiating treaties for more open trade with
the United States.' 2 Likewise, joint venture activity in Europe is
likely to increase beginning in 1993 as European Community mar-

ket efficiencies and open competition provide opportunities for

Tang & Chwo-Ming Joseph Yu, Foreign Market Entry: Production-Related Strategies, 36
MGMT. SCL 476 (1990). Tang and Yu categorize the entry strategies as follows:
(i) [F]oreign direct investment, where an entering firm establishes a whollyowned subsidiary; (ii) exclusive licensing, where an entering firm licenses its
know-how to a single local licensee; (iii) multiple licensing, where an entering
firm licenses its know-how to several local licensees; (iv) a joint venture, where
an entering firm shares the ownership of a local venture with a local partner
and does not charge any fes for the use of the know-how; (v) a combination
of joint venture and licensing, where an entering firm forms a joint venture
with a local partner and, at the same time, licenses its know-how to the local
venture.
Id. at 476.
9. For example, the former Soviet Union opened new private cooperative opportunities
to foreign investors through two decrees in 1987 and 1988. The 1987 decree permitted
Soviet companies to enter joint ventures with foreign companies, establishing the first significant opportunities for DFI in the Soviet Union in over sixty years. Decree of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on Questions Concerning the Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures, International Associations and Organizations with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management
Bodies, Jan. 13, 1987 [hereinafter Soviet Joint Venture Law]. The second decree, in 1988,
further facilitated the logistics of international joint ventures in the Soviet Union. Decree
No. 1405 of December 2, 1988 on the Further Development of Foreign Economic Activity
of State, Cooperative, and Other Public Enterprises, Entities, and Organizations, December
2, 1988.
10. The extent to which host countries require local ownership or local majority ownership seems to be diminishing as international markets continue to become more open in
the 1990s. For example, restrictions on amounts of foreign ownership in the former Soviet
Union have been liberalized since 1987. See David M. Bost, The 1987 Soviet Joint Venture Law: New Possibilities for Cooperation and Growth in East-West Relations, 17
DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 581, 584 (1989) (discussing the feasibility of American venture partners owning majority interests in joint ventures in Russia).
11. VERN TERPSTRA, INTERNATIONAL DMENsioNs OF MARKErN
116-17 (2d ed.
1988).
12. For a discussion of adaptation of joint ventures to Mexico's emerging economy,
see Rona R. Mears, Joint Ventures in Mexico: A Current Perspective, 23 ST. MARY'S LJ.
611, 622-24 (1992).

INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES

American companies whose domestic
International joint ventures may
graphical diversification in situations
as when foreign investors rely on
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markets are saturated. 13
also serve to facilitate geonot related to global politics,
the marketing expertise and

established distribution networks of the domestic partner." Joint
ventures may be formed across borders in order to promote the
transfer of proprietary technologies and processes, or to exploit

synergies which exist by virtue of differentiated but complementary
strengths of parent companies.15 Some international joint ventures
are created to reduce risk, 6 particularly in such volatile industries
as biotechnology. Joint ventures can also provide American partners with host-country management that has an equity stake in the
endeavor and understands the local business environment. 8 A
swell of Japanese investment in international joint ventures in the
United States and Europe accompanied Japan's transition from

technological dependency to technological leadership, functioning as
what one author calls "'trade-oriented' investment."' 9 This kind of
joint venture is aimed at increasing export opportunitiese and expansion into overseas marketplaces that are less competitive than

those in Japan.2' Economic analysis explains the use of international joint ventures as an application of the transaction cost theo-

13. For a discussion of the anticipated effects of the unification of Europe in 1993,
see Stewart Toy, Europe's Shakeout: The Race to Restructure is Getting Frantic, Bus.
WK., Sept. 14, 1992, at 44, 44-46.
14. ROBERT P. LYNCH, THE PRACrcAL GuIDE TO JoINT VENTURES AND CORPORATE
ALuANCES: How TO FORM, How TO ORGANIZE, How TO OPERATE 19 (1989).
15. Japanese companies, for example, are often motivated to enter joint ventures with
American companies to obtain technology transfers. For some examples of this phenomenon, see Shishido, supra note 7, at 75-76.
16. See Farok J. Contractor, Dispersion of Risk Through Multinational Teamwork, 22
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 73 (1987) (discussing the use of international joint ventures to
reduce political and financial risks).
17. See Giovanna A. Cinelli, Biotechnological Research and Development: The Joint
Venture as a Viable Corporate Entity in a High Risk Industry, 13 J. CORP. L. 549, 550
(1988) (discussing how corporations operating in the rapidly changing field of biotechnology enter into joint ventures in order to remain competitive).
18. See Rosalie L. Tung, Selection and Training Procedures of U.S., European, and
Japanese Multinationals, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 57 (1982) (discussing some advantages
host-country nationals have over expatriates in the management of local subsidiaries of
multinational corporations).
19. Louis TuRNER, INDmuSTRAL COLLABORATION WrrH JAPAN 13 (1987) (discussing
how "trade-oriented" strategies contrast with the traditional "trade-destroying" investment
strategies embraced by European and American multinationals).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 14.
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ry, 2 although one consultant has observed that "[s]aving cash
alone is not enough to justify an alliance."'
While all collaborative strategies bring an array of complex
problems, the international joint venture is perhaps the most demanding.' Difficulties associated with cooperation can be magnified by legal, linguistic, and cultural differences. An enterprise's
effectiveness and longevity may depend on the successful resolution of these special challenges to international ventures.
This article addresses some of the problems peculiar to the
international joint venture, and focuses on the ways in which the
contract and negotiations that form the venture can be improved to
increase the venture's utility and longevity. Section II addresses the
challenges associated with dispute resolution during international
collaboration. In Section III, I discuss important linguistic considerations in drafting transnational joint venture contracts. Section IV
concerns the cultural factors that must be considered in the course
of negotiating and contracting the establishment of an international
venture. The conclusion in Section V serves to summarize and
integrate the foregoing observations, and to suggest some directions
for future research in this area.
II.

LEGAL CHALLENGES OF CONTRACTING: PROVIDING FOR

EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

While international venturing creates a seemingly endless array
of substantive legal challenges, this article emphasizes those that
relate to the processes of negotiation, contracting, and dispute resolution. The discussion in this section focuses on these associational
aspects of joint venture contracting- the consensual infrastructure
adopted by the venture to manage ongoing relations.'
22. See, e.g., Jean-Francois Hennar, The Transaction Costs Theory of Joint Ventures:
An Empirical Study of Japanese Subsidiaries in the United States, 37 MGMT. SCL 483

(1991) (stating that the transaction cost theory posits that the choice between joint venture
and wholly owned subsidiary will depend on the costs (such as free riding by the partner)
and benefits (such as access to technology and markets) of the shared ownership of a
joint venture versus the wholly owned subsidiary).
23. Sherman, supra note 2, at 77.
24. The demands placed on all international business enterprises are complex. International joint venture failure may be attributable to inability to overcome difficulties related
to law, language and culture. See KENICHI OHMAE, THE MIND OF THE STRATEGiST. BUSINESS PLANNING FOR COMPETTVE ADVANTAGE 177-80 (1983) (stating that "without care-

ful individual study of the more than 150 independent nations that make up the world
today, effective penetration of the right overseas markets is hardly possible," and discussing American and Japanese business starts that have failed in Europe and South America).
25. Dispute resolution is mentioned by one commentator as one of four crucial consid-
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International joint ventures, like their domestic counterparts,
can provide for alternative means of dispute resolution26 or allow,
by default, for traditional dispute resolution within courts of jurisdiction. Under either option, questions of conflict of laws should

be addressed at this stage of contracting.' If arbitration is rejected
in favor of recourse to litigation, the parties to an international

contract may stipulate their choice of a judicial forum for resolving
disputes that may arise.s
Provision for effective dispute resolution is perhaps even more
important to international joint ventures than to their domestic
counterparts because international joint ventures tend to be more
highly idiosyncratic to the needs of the parents, so that either

partner's stake is very difficult to sell. Joint ventures in Japan, for
example, typically take the form of closely held corporations,29
whose shares have no public market. Either parent, and particularly

erations for the success of cross-border strategic alliances. Guy de Jonquieres, Corporate
Alliances: Equal Partnerships Stand a*Better Chance of Success, FiN. TIMES, May 15,
1991, at 11 (suggesting that parents venturing across borders "[b]e prepared for disputes,
failed communications, and other troubles during the first two years").
26. While contractual provisions for dispute resolution are desirable, their importance
can be mitigated with effective contractual mechanisms for dispute avoidance. Modem
approaches to contract have placed greater significance on averting disagreements as a,
preventative legal practice, under a theory that prevention is usually more desirable than
cure. For a classic discussion of the desirability of using contract law to avoid litigation
and conflicts rather that to just resolve them, see SAmUEL WILLISTON, SOME MODERN
TENDENcIES IN THE LAW 95 (1929).
27. There is some movement toward developing international norms and codes covering
all kinds of transnational business ventures, such as the International Chamber of Commerce Guidelines (1972), the International Labor Organization Tripartite Declaration Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), and principles and equitable
rules of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1980). See Sotirios G.
Mousouris, Codes of Conduct Facing Transnational Corporations, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATiONAL BusINEss 9.4 to 9.5 (Ingo Walter & Tracy Murray eds., 2d ed. 1988).
Progress of this movement may eventually reduce the importance of addressing conflict of
laws in international joint venture contracts.
28. Choice of forum clauses are generally enforceable, at least under American law.
However, such clauses may be stricken in the event of fraud or overreaching, or when
the clause is one of adhesion and the forum chosen is seriously inconvenient. See, e.g.,
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("[Inn the light of presentday commercial realities and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum
clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.").
29. See Zenichi Shishido, Problems of the Closely Held Corporation: A Comparative
Study of the Japanese and American Legal Systems and a Critique of the Japanese Tentative Draft on Close Corporations.38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 337 (1990) (discussing analogies
to partnerships and corporations available to joint ventures in Japan). These closely held
joint ventures in Japan are usually in the form of Yugengaisha, for which there is no
precise American equivalent. Ld.at 337-38.
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a majority-ownership parent, can use the captivity of the other
either to coerce agreement or squeeze the disadvantaged party out

of the venture. 3' By addressing dispute resolution in the joint venture contract, the parents can provide a problem-solving framework
prior to the development of disagreements and thus prevent future

manipulation.
A.

Arbitration Clauses

Arbitration clauses are the most commonly used contractual

tools for providing alternative dispute resolution in joint ventures.31 Public policy, including several United Nations conven-

tions on the enforcement of international arbitration awards, has
evolved over the past few decades to support and to expedite the
use of international arbitration. 32 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has enforced private arbitration agreements, even for
the resolution of disputes entailing both public and private interests.33
Use of arbitration panels may be preferable to litigation for
several reasons. First, arbitration is more private and informal than
a public trial.' The less publicized nature of arbitration compared
to trial may be important in allowing parties in conffict to save
face, particularly if either parent's culture is averse to litigation or
views lawsuits as bringing disgrace.' Second, arbitration can allow parties to choose a decisionmaker considered more neutral than
a foreign court might be. The neutrality of private arbitration may

30. Shishido, supra note 7, at 83.
31. For a thorough discussion of arbitration agreements, see W. LAURENCE CRAIG Er
AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1990).
32. For a discussion of these policies favoring international arbitration, see Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974
(2d Cir. 1974) ("[E]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on [a public
policy] basis only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions
of morality and justice.").
33. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) ("There is no reason to depart from [the federal policy favoring arbitration] guidelines where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory
rights.").
34. John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International Trade: A
Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 361, 378-79 (1986) (discussing how the private nature, neutrality, and informality of international arbitration encourage its use and expanding role in
international trade).
35. For a discussion of attitudes of Japanese management towards litigation, see RICHARD T. PASCALE & ANTHONY G. ATHos, TH-E ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT (1981).
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be particularly desirable for ventures operating in foreign countries
where justice systems are perceived to be held captive to national

interests.36 Third, prospects for successful resolution of conflict
and the ultimate survival of the venture may be improved by
avoiding the trauma of litigation.
The most compelling disadvantage of international arbitration

is cost. The expense of international arbitration is a function of
several factors: the high fees charged by international arbitration
organizations, the tendency of international arbitrators to use panels
rather than individuals, and the expenses associated with translation
and travel. 37 These costs must be weighed against the anticipated
reduction in the costs of the adversarial process inherent in a

mechanism for arbitration, as well as the value of continued good
will and mutual parental support.3' A commitment to resolve disputes amicably through arbitration may improve the venture's prospects for functioning effectively after the conflict in question is
determined.39
Parents that decide to include an arbitration provision in their

joint venture contract must also decide how specific to make the
contractual terms. While there are many gradations of specificity,
ventures tend to provide for arbitration using one of two general
approaches: ad hoc clauses and institutional clauses.' Ad hoc
clauses create a basic commitment to arbitrate disagreements, without establishing the particular rules of arbitration to be applied41
and without choosing the arbitration board or institution that is to

36. For example, the arbitrazh, an administrative agency which functions as a court in
former Soviet states, is perceived by some to be too closely aligned with national interests to provide an equitable forum for Western partner participation. See Isaak I. Dore,
Plan and Contract in the Domestic and Foreign Trade of the USSR, 8 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 29, 91-92 (1980).
37. Allison, supra note 34, at 378-79.
38. See John R. Allison, Easing the Pain of Legal Disputes: The Evolution and Future
of Reform, 33 BUs. HORIZONS 13, 15 (1990) (observing that while commercial arbitration
is still essentially adversarial, the agreement to arbitrate tends to evince a desire and commitment to settle differences relatively amicably).
39. John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 221-22

(1986).
40. For a detailed discussion of these two approaches, see John P. Feldman, Soviet
Joint Ventures: Providingfor Appropriate Dispute Resolution, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.i. 107,
120-22 (1990).
41. Different arbitration centers have different rules, such as the rules of The International Chamber of Commerce or of the United Nations. Id. at 121.
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govern.42 Institutional clauses designate in advance the governing
organization and the rules that will apply to arbitration.43 Whichever form of arbitration the parties provide in the joint venture
contract, the commitment to arbitration should be unambiguous and
firm once made because equivocation straddling arbitration and
litigation generally results in the parties resorting to the latter."
Ad hoc provisions have several advantages over institutional
provisions, including flexibility, efficiency, and information accrual
advantages. Ad hoc arbitration confers flexibility on the dispute
resolution process by allowing conflicting parents to choose an
arbitration forum best suited to a particular kind of dispute, given
the arbitration board's expertise and strengths in various areas of
practice. By delaying particular arbitration choices the parents also
avoid transaction costs involved in negotiating and contracting with
potentially unused arbitration organizations. As the needs and expectations of the parties change, so may their choices for dispute
resolution. Yet a series of anticipatory changes may be premature
and inefficient if there is, as we hope, no dispute to resolve. In
this context, the need to change specified arbitration provisions is a
function of over-specification prior to optimal information accrual.
The ad hoc approach delays specification of arbitration terms until
information sufficient for making acceptably rational decisions has
accrued.
The institutional approach has advantages as well. If a disagreement occurs which threatens the effective functioning or even
the survival of the venture, or which requires quick resolution to
exploit an opportunity, an early and detailed commitment to an
institution of arbitration can expedite dispute resolution. By specify-,
ing the rules45 and the organization which will be used for arbitration, an institutional clause removes the logistical step of setting up

42. Id. at 120.
43. Id. at 121.
44. William W. Park, Arbitration of International Contract Disputes, 39 BUS. LAW.
1783, 1783-84 (1984).
45. The specification of rules, such as the Rules of the InternationalChamber of Commerce, however, can result in unintended ambiguity which undermines the desire to stabilize arbitration parameters at the start of the venture. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Indon. Inc. v.
Asamera Oil (Indon.) Ltd., 372 N.E.2d 21, 22 (N.Y. 1977) (showing how a 1968 contract,
which stipulated arbitration "in accordance with the Rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce," resulted in ambiguity regarding whether the parties intended to apply the
1955 rules which were in existence at the time of contracting, or the revised 1975 rules
which were adopted after contracting).
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a workable process that would be required under ad hoe arbitration.
A firm commitment to a particular mode of arbitration may
also help to allay misgivings which invariably arise when a new
venture is created. Ad hoc clauses are analogous to "agreements to
agree," in which the concept of mandatory, relatively amicable
resolution is embraced, but which lack a fixed means to achieve
that process. Since international joint ventures always have an
additional layer of uncertainty because of the magnified cultural
and normative differences between parents, the security of stipulated particulars concerning arbitration may provide a zone of comfort
necessary at the venture's incipiency. Moreover, ad hoc arbitration
clauses are predicated on the assumption that feuding parties can
negotiate the particulars of arbitration amicably and with sufficient
ease. When this presumption proves unrealistic, institutional arbitration clauses have the advantage of fixing the rules prior to the
development of the differences which may impede cooperative ad
hoc arbitration.47
. In addition to considering the advantages and disadvantages of
ad hoc and institutional arbitration clauses, international joint venturers should consider how venture risk, cultural and transactionspecific dimensions of trust, and barriers to exit factor into the
choice of the optimal arbitration clause. Each of these factors is
discussed separately in the following sections.
1. Degree of Venture Risk
High-risk ventures tend to be compatible with ad hoe arbitration, whereas low-risk ventures are congruous with institutional
arbitration.4 8 Because a high degree of risk is associated with low
foreseeability over the span of a strategic planning horizon, fixing
arbitration rules and choosing governing organizations early may
prove unsuitable as events shift in unpredictable ways..
46. Mobil Oil, 372 N.E.2d at 21.
47. See Park, supra note 44, at 1784.
48. Degree of risk may be idiosyncratic to the particular venture itself, or it may be
more systematic, such as the high level of risk which typifies ventures in new industries.
For a discussion of how high risk in embryonic industries can be a source of potential
conflict, see Kathryn PL Harrigan, Joint Ventures and Competitive Strategy, 9 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 141, 154 (1988).
49. High-risk ventures, generally steeped in conditions of uncertainty, should be able to
reduce transaction costs by participating in ad hoc rather than institutional arbitration
agreements. These savings result from the removal of unnecessarily burdensome commitments that are likely to require costly modification. For example, early commitment to an
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While an institutional arbitration clause may therefore be too
rigid given the vicissitudes of high-risk ventures, ad hoc arbitration
can be tempered by the use of either mandatory or precatory contingency clauses in which the rules and institutions of arbitration
vary by stipulated circumstance." Such contingency clauses allow
the venture to maintain the flexibility which may be indispensable
in high-risk situations, while expediting the settlement of logistical
considerations associated with arbitration choices. Because high-risk
ventures may require expedient resolution of conflict, contingency
clauses are an effective tool for achieving acceptable levels of both
flexibility and speed.
Low-risk ventures require less flexibility and rely less on
quick reaction and responsiveness to environmental signals than
high-risk ventures. As a result, low-risk ventures generally seek
security and control rather than speedy adaptability in arbitration
provisions. Institutional clauses that fix which organizations will
preside and which rules will apply maximize predictability. The
loss of maneuverability that inevitably results from early, highly
specified commitment will be of little concern to low-risk ventures
that operate in stable environments.5 1
2.

Cultural and Transaction-Specific Dimensions of Trust

Ad hoc arbitration is advantageous when there is a considerable degree of mutual trust upon which the parents can rely. Conversely, when the parents operate under conditions of mistrust,
institutional arbitration may be preferred. The trust continuum acts
in this context as a proxy for the predicted effectiveness of the
"agreement to agree" component of ad hoc arbitration. The
venture's ability to defer arbitration specificity to the latest time to
maximize incorporation of relevant information is a function of the
maturity of the parents' relationship and of their reliance upon
mutual good faith.52
institution that proves faulty may require breach of contractual obligations in order to
provide for what proves over time to be more suitable arbitration.
For a discussion of the relationship between transaction costs and desirable degrees
of contractual specificity, see Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 247-54 (1979).
50. For example, arbitration of technology access and transfer issues may be subject to
arbitration by organization A under one set of arbitration rules, while decisions regarding
management disputes may be subject to arbitration by organization B under another set of
rules.
51. See Williamson, supra note 49, at 250-54.
52. The degree of justifiable trust that exists between co-venturers is partially a func-
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Trust in contracting is both a cultural and a transaction-specific artifact. From a macro-organizational standpoint, degrees of
trust are probably also a function of levels of organizational inter-

dependence, which creates incentives for each party to behave in a
trustworthy manner. Failure to meet expectations of trustworthiness
may dry up resources upon which the disappointing party depends.
This dynamic encourages self-policing
behavior, which in turn
53
establishes increments of reliable trust.

The cultural aspect of trust as a component of contract refers
to differences between one culture and another in terms of contract
specificity, combativeness in resolving disagreements, and tendencies to engage in the kind of opportunistic behavior likely to result
in conflict. In cultures where the element of contractual trust is
high, contract language need not be very specific. Conflict is
avoided rather than encouraged, and resolved amicably rather than
adversarially. Conversely, cultures evincing low levels of con-

tractual trust must compensate for the deficiency by greatly elaborating contractual terms. In low-trust cultures, conflict is common
and acceptable, and is resolved adversarially, typically through the

process of litigation.5'
While cultural tendencies may provide a rough approximation

tion of cultural differences in values in general, as well as the degree of reliance on noncontractual, more relational maintenance of collaborative arrangements. Several aspects of
Japanese business practices, for example, support the development of trust sufficient to
justify ad hoc arbitration: (i) Japanese companies tend to engage in protracted negotiation
and courting periods prior to entering joint venture arrangements, allowing development of
interpersonal relationships which support justifiable trust; and (ii) partially because of this
extended courtship process, trust is considered a reliable proxy for contract under many
circumstances. See TIMOTHY M. COLLINS & THOMAS L. DoORLEY Ill, TEAMING UP FOR
THE 90'S: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL JOiNT VENTURES AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 29798 (1991) ("[fIor the Japanese the building of mutual trust is the first item on the agenda in any business relationship.').
In the United States, finely articulated contract terminology combined with a high
incidence of litigation tends to create a mistrustful contracting environment relative to
other cultures. Yet, as contracting in the United States has progressed from classical to
neoclassical and even relational varieties, the American contracting culture may be moving
toward greater flexibility and reliance upon justifiably trustworthy alliances. In other countries, such as Japan, contracts traditionally have been little more than declarations of good
faith and a general commitment to support future dealings with another party. See THE
HANDBOOK OF JOiNT VENTURING 374-76, 390-91 (John D. Carter et al. eds., 1988).
53. For a discussion of the nature of interorganizational interdependence in joint ventures, see Jeffrey Pfeffer & Phillip Nowak, Joint Ventures and InterorganizationalInterdependence, 21 ADMIN. SCL Q. 398 (1976).
54. For an illustration of the differences between American and Japanese cultures regarding development of trust in business relationships, see supra note 52.
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of expected levels of trust between parties from different cultures,

variation within these stereotypes must be accounted for as well. In
this sense, transaction-specific levels of trust must be measured in
order to fine-tune the choice of arbitration provision. Parent companies from usually low-trust contracting cultures may nonetheless
develop an atypical relationship of trust." Data on particular coventurers' expectations of trust must be incorporated into the draft-

ing of the arbitration clause, accounting for both the unique relations between the particular parents, and the legal and cultural

limitations that may bind their ability to operate in the normally
ambiguous atmosphere of ad hoc arbitration.
If the cultural and transaction-specific levels of trust seem
sufficient to support ad hoc arbitration, and the barriers to exit and
repositioning discussed below are high, then ad hoc arbitration is
probably preferable for its flexibility and malleability, which allow
for last-minute accommodations in the course of the venture's
development. If, however, overall levels of both types of trust are
poor, then it may be necessary to sacrifice the benefits of ad hoc
arbitration for gains from the stabilizing influence of the institution-

al variety.
3.

Barriers to Exit and Repositioning

Kathryn R. Harrigan has observed that failure of management
systems to adapt to a new venture's industry dynamics may create
barriers to exit56 "by impeding [the venture's] ability to reposition

its strategy with respect to customers or vertical linkages with its

55. See Sherman, supra note 2, at 77-78 (stating that two large U.S. companies, Corning and Ford, have effectively used trust in their dealings to build very successful joint
ventures). As American companies gain more experience with international partners who
expect higher working levels of trust between co-venturers, American parents become
more like their Japanese counterparts. For example, Coming Vice Chairman Van Campbell
stated, "you... constantly have to deal with the relationship you have with the partner- nurturing it and maintaining high-level contacts, so that when you deal with items
of substance you will be dealing with friends, people you understand and respect." Id. at
77.
56. For a good general discussion of the nature of exit barriers, see Richard E. Caves
& Michael E. Porter, Barriers to Exit, in ESSAYS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN HONOR OF JOE S. BAIN 39-69 (David P. Quails & Robert E. Masson, eds., 1976). For the
purposes of this article, the term "barriers to exit" to refer to barriers that are a product
of industrial characteristics and dynamics rather than transactional barriers that may be
erected by parent firms as incentives to continue the venture. These transactional barriers
are generally contractual in nature. For example, penalties may be applied to a parent
company seeking to exit the venture.
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parents."'57 Barriers to exit are the result of industry dynamics
which impose economic costs upon a decision to leave that industry." The phenomenon of repositioning occupies the middle
ground between stasis and exit, such that the venture significantly
alters its products or markets without entirely abandoning the industry.
Barriers which impede either the exiting of an industry or the
repositioning within an industry are undesirable obstructions of
flexibility. 9 In the international context these barriers are exacer-

bated by a number of factors: geographic distance tends to magnify
costs associated with either exiting or repositioning-, foreign gov-

ernments may impose regulatory barriers compelling the continuation of operations viewed as vital to economic development;6
and incremental legal complexities associated with dissolution
across borders tend to impose additional transaction costs upon the
exit of any transnational venture, acting as a disincentive to discontinue or realign operations.'

57. KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES FOR JOINT VENTURES 120 (1985).
58. An example of this kand of exit barrier is found in capital intensive industries,
such as steel and oil, where the salvage value of capital investments is a fraction of book
value and few buyers can afford to pay even salvage value.
For a discussion of the kinds of exit barriers that often exist in international joint
ventures, see R_ DUANE HALL, THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE 10 (1984) (discussing
such problems of "[g]etting out of business [as] . . . the presence of specialized assets or
low liquidation value of assets; . . . the need to 'buy off' a union; emotional barriers that
can cause difficulties, such as tradition, people loyalty, customs, and local practices; or
even social barriers").
59. The joint venture itself is sometimes a mechanism for reducing parents' exit barriers. Harrigan notes, for example, that "Ij]oint ventures may . . . be used to permit firms
to divest their assets incrementally in situations where they face such high exit barriers
that no buyer could afford to purchase them outright." HARRIGAN, supra note 57, at 10809.
60. These costs include expenses associated with moving a plant and equipment, hiring
agents for overseas sales of assets, and hiring overseas legal counsel to handle the complexities of foreign dissolution.
61. A related phenomenon can occur when foreign governments are part-owners of
joint ventures. Industrial policy considerations may compel the governmental owner to
continue operations that would be abandoned by unrestricted private owners if the venture
is viewed as serving an important national interest. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRES AND COMPETORS 292-93
(1980) (discussing the need to assess industrial policy and the political and economic climate of co-venturer countries).
62. The likelihood that one parent will not welcome the other parent's desire to exit is
increased when the parents enter the venture with different motives, as is usually the case
in symbiotic international ventures formed for the purpose of exploiting each other's comparative advantage. When the parents have different motives for venturing they will each
view the success of the venture using criteria related to their separate motives. For exam-
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Exit barriers will affect the desirability and feasibility of ad
hoc versus institutional arbitration provisions. High exit barriers act
as an incentive for the amicable resolution of conflict, because the
barriers impose prohibitive costs on the failure to reach such resolution. The need to resolve disputes quickly is heightened by the
intensely competitive environment that tends to result when exit
barriers inflate supply.63 As a result, when barriers to exit are
high, tolerance for ad hoc arbitration is also high. Conflicting parents understand that the penalty for failure to settle disagreements
may be the prohibitively expensive dissolution of the venture.
Systemic pressures associated with the need to continue operations
will tend to result in a culture of accommodation and
compromise.' These characteristics render ad hoc arbitration less
costly than institutional arbitration for several reasons: (i) ad hoc
arbitration can be tailored to the demands of a specific dispute, and
can therefore address that dispute more effectively and more efficiently; (ii) ad hoc arbitration avoids the reiterative transaction
costs of modifying institutional arbitration provisions that may
prove inappropriate under certain conditions; and (iii) ad hoc arbitration is more flexible than institutional arbitration and may be
more conducive to pre-arbitration resolution of conflict, which
results in arbitration avoidance and financial and psychological cost
savings. Because barriers to exit tend to be higher for international
joint ventures than for domestic joint ventures, ad hoc arbitration,
rather than institutional arbitration, is often more suitable.
When barriers to exit are low, incentives to avert irreconcilable differences and resulting dissolution are also low. Low exit

pie, if an American company is dissatisfied with the venture because foreign markets for
their product have proven disappointing, but the co-venturer is happy with the technology
transfer that has occurred under the venture, the American parent will have difficulty
exiting without resistance. The divergence of parental goals characteristic of international
joint ventures can create substantial exit barriers which may lead to expensive international
litigation or dispute resolution. The very prospect of these processes will act in itself as a
barrier to exit.
63. For a discussion of the relationship between exit barriers and intra-industry competition, see KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY: A MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR
CHANGING TIMES 125-38 (1985).
64. This phenomenon occurs because exit barriers decrease strategic flexibility, forcing
industry competitors to find ways of reducing risk. RICHARD CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 31-32 (6th ed. 1987). One way an organization facing high exit barriers can reduce its risk profile is to eliminate unwieldy and
unpredictable adversarial proceedings through a culture of adaptability and indulgence in
business relations.
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barriers result in reduced stakes in the continuation of the venture
so that parents are relatively unconcerned with adapting and adjusting to one another's expectations. In these instances, institutional
arbitration may be more suitable than ad hoc arbitration. The low
exit barriers do nothing to discourage discord, and therefore add
their own peculiar element of systematic volatility and instability. A high degree of structure will help restore a portion of

equilibrium under these conditions'
provides that structure which is
Fixing the resolution infrastructure
in savings by removing points of
disputes that might arise.67
As noted earlier, international

and institutional arbitration

lacking in the ad hoc variety.
prior to disagreement will result
procedural contention from any
ventures are generally subject to

higher exit barriers than their domestic counterparts. Still, each
venture must be scrutinized individually to determine the type of

arbitration clause most suitable. In general, high exit barriers
should indicate, ceteris paribus, the utility of ad hoc arbitration.
Likewise, low exit barriers should normally be associated with
institutional arbitration.

65. It has been noted earlier that high exit barriers are a source of instability because
of the increased competition from exaggerated supply created when those who wish to
leave the industry are economically restrained from doing so. ld The instability created
by low exit barriers is of a different variety, attributable to the frailty of contractual relations which results from low-level parting stakes. In essence, low barriers to exit expand
the range of predictable behaviors under pressure, as co-venturers here have the option of
leaving an undesirable situation. This augmented scope of behavior adds an element of
unpredictability to joint venture relationships.
66. This movement toward equilibrium is noted in organizational theory as normal, rational behavior. See, e.g., JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS iN ACTON: SOCIAL ScIENCE BASES OF ADMImSTRATnvE THEORY 21 (1967) ("Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to anticipate and adapt to environmental changes which cannot be buffered or
leveled.").
67. Institutional arbitration should reduce transaction costs associated with dispute resolution when exit barriers are low, for the following reasons:
(i) Because low exit barriers correlate with low incentive to accommodate, hammering out the specific terms of arbitration after a dispute has arisen is likely to be difficult.
The selection of arbitration specifics during the period of peace and good will that exists
at the time the venture is created will reduce the expenses, such as legal fees, associated
with bargaining and haggling during times of conflict.
(ii) The expedience of institutional arbitration may enhance the prospects of a speedy
resolution of the conflict itself, reducing costs associated with dispute settlement.
(iii) The avoidance of incremental sources of friction connected with setting up arbitration specifics during wartime should increase the venture's prospects of survival (if in
fact survival is desirable upon resolution of the conflict). Even low exit barriers involve
some cost of dissolution which can be saved if an otherwise agreeable venture can be
successfully salvaged.

1238

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 43:1221

Conflict of Laws

Whether the parents of an international venture choose to

provide for arbitration of disputes or simply to subject any disagreements to litigation, areas of contention will often be affected
by conflict of laws. Potential conflict of laws is magnified when
joint ventures cross international borders because the laws of the
parent companies' countries tend to vary more than laws between
states or provinces within the same country. While co-venturers
across international borders will generally want to stipulate choice
of law as a term of the contract, they cannot uniformly rely on
enforcement of such clauses throughout the world.' American
parents of international joint ventures should be aware of the approach taken by American courts to resolve conflicts regarding
contracts. They must also understand the approach of the partner

country's conflict laws, and determine which conflicts approach
will be applied.69
In the United States, the law applied to a contract has traditionally been a function of the intent of the parties in the matter. 0
This means that the parties can state, in the contract, which law is
to prevail in the event of a disagreement. If the parents fail to so
stipulate, intent may be inferred from the facts and conditions of
contracting."1 When a court has no basis for determining the particular intention of the parties, presumptions of generic intent will
apply. For example, questions regarding the content of the contract
are determined under the law of the place where the contract was

68. E.g., Carlyle E. Maw, Conflict Avoidance in International Contracts, in INTERNACHOICE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE 23, 30 (Willis L.M. Reese ed.,
1962) ("The doctrine of 'party autonomy' has not yet advanced to the point where we
can place full reliance on the governing law clause for all purposes.").
69. Conflict of laws questions in international ventures are extremely complex, and the
ability of the contracting parties to stipulate the choice of law to be applied is not absolute under all circumstances. For a detailed examination of these questions, see ANTONIO
BOGGIANO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD CONTRACTS: THE PRICE OF FAIRNESS (1991).
70. See, e.g., Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Can., Ltd. v. Warner, 260 U.S. 201,
203 (1922) ("[I]t does not appear that the contracting parties in making [the contract] had
in view any other law than that of the place where [the contract] was made."); Fidelity
Mut. Life Ass'n v. Harris, 57 S.W. 635, 638 (Tex. 1900) ("It is true, however, that the
effect of a contract, wherever it may come in question, is to be determined by the law
with reference to which the parties contracted.
...
).
71. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 164 F. Supp.
393, 397-98 (D. Minn. 1958) ("Since the [contract] contemplated performance in several
states, it should be presumed that the parties intended the law of the place of performance to control their intentions.
...
).
TIONAL CONTRACTS:
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drafted, whereas questions regarding performance are determined
under the law of the place where execution is to occur.72
More recent American approaches to conflict of laws questions
involving contracts reject the intent approach in favor of a "center
of gravity" theory in which the courts apply the law of the forum
which has the most significant contacts with the transaction to be
adjudicated.73 While intent of the parties may be an important
factor in determining which jurisdiction has the most contacts with
the issue in contest, intent is not in itself dispositive of conflicts
questions under the center of gravity approach.74 Thus, co-venturers should place somewhat less reliance on choice of laws clauses
for contracts drafted or to be executed in center of gravity states
than in states that look to the parties' intent. They should also
distinguish between subtleties in center of gravity approaches, some
of which are almost indistinguishable from intent-based approaches
due to the impressive weight placed on intent in determining the
jurisdiction with the most significant contacts. 5

When an international joint venture is domiciled outside the
United States, litigation of local issues is likely to fall within the
jurisdiction of local courts, and foreign conflict of laws principles
will apply. In some instances the laws of the host country are
obligatory, to the exclusion of American laws. For example, Polish
labor laws apply by statute to labor relations in enterprises domiciled in Poland.7 Likewise, Soviet Joint Venture Law under the
72. See, e.g., Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101 (N.Y. 1954) (reciting the traditional
rule that "'[a]ll matters being upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity of

contracts . . . are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made,' while
'all matters connected with its performance . . . are regulated by the law of the place
where the contract, by its terms, is to be performed.'" (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)).
73. See, e.g., W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. 1945) ("[I]t is
appropriate that a transaction be governed by the law of the state with which it is most

closely in contact, not because of the quasi-location of a legal concept ....

").

74. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443 (N.Y. 1961) ("The more modem
view is that 'the courts . . . lay emphasis . . . upon the law of the place which has the

most significant contacts with the matter in dispute."' (alterations in original) (citations
omitted)).
75. See, e.g., Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1950) (ap-

plying a center of gravity conflict of laws approach which relies heavily on the parties'
intent).
76. The Law of July 6, .1982 on Principles of Conducting the Economic Activity in
the Sphere of Small Business By Foreign Entities and Individuals Within the Territory of
the Republic of Poland, 1989 Dz. U. No. 27, 148, art. 23, available in WESTLAW, 1991

WL 319080 (Polska).
For a discussion of the "obligatory applicability of host countries' labor laws" in
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Kremlin's edict of January 13, 1987 provided that the resolution of
disputes between joint venture partners or within the venture itself
"shall be settled either by Soviet courts of law, or if so agreed by
the parties, by an arbitration court . ..."'
When application of local laws is not mandated by statute, the
number of approaches to resolving contractual conflicts varies
widely. One of the more common methods, in addition to variants
of the American conflicts doctrines discussed earlier, is to apply
the law of the country in whose language the contract has been
drafted to questions of contract construction. 78 This approach appears to be a form of intent-oriented conflicts of law doctrine,
probably the most prevalent among courts that have not usurped
choice of law legislative edict. Because of the wide variety of
conflict of laws approaches available throughout the world, American co-venturers need to examine the conflict of laws principles of
their own states as well as those of the partner parents.
III.

LINGUISTIC

CHALLENGES 79 OF CONTRACTING: THE COM-

PLEXITIES OF CROSS-LANGUAGE DRAFING

International joint ventures always generate linguistic challenges." Disparities in language are an important consideration be-

Eastern European international joint ventures, see Georgios N. Boukaouris, Joint Ventures
in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, 21 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 42-43 (1989).
77. Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, at 2.
78. See BOGOiANO, supra note 69, at 90 ("When it is deemed that the parties have

not accepted another interpretation, the law of the language used would appear to be the
proper law of construction, for this law becomes the context and background of words
which have a legal significance.").
79. I divide the remainder of my discussion into sections on linguistic challenges, infra
part HI,and cultural challenges, infra part IV, as a method of organizing categories of
concerns. Obviously, these categories overlap, since language and culture interact and
affect one another. For a discussion of culture and communication, see PHILIP R. HARRIS
& ROBERT T. MORAN, MANAGING CULTURAL DmFERENcEs 20-23 (1979).

80. Even if the venture is between companies in different countries which use the
same primary language, linguistic challenges will arise because of differences in dialect,
syntax, and usage. For example, the English language in Great Britain has developed
differently than the English language in the United States and the English language in
Australia. While language also develops differently within national borders, the degree of
insulation and cultural disparity supporting differences is likely to be greater across national borders. Linguistic challenges should tend to be more significant between companies
that utilize different primary languages, with one possible counter-intuitive dynamic: these
companies are more likely to recognize the linguistic challenge made obvious by the
utilization of entirely different languages and to provide for related difficulties. However,
venturers from American and British parent companies, for example, may be less likely to
anticipate linguistic obstacles, thereby reducing vigilance. Under these circumstances, the
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cause they increase the likelihood of gaps and errors in communication.8 Contractual terms have no absolute meaning independent
of the context in which they are created;' and socio-linguistic differences between contracting parties create breeding grounds for
contextual ambiguities.
Linguistic challenges will occur at two levels: at the contracting stage itself,83 and over the course of the venture's life, as the
contract is implemented. Vigilance regarding linguistic sources of

misunderstanding during both formulation and implementation of
the contract is crucial. 84

When collaboration exists between companies sharing the same
primary language, the joint venture contract will, of course, be in
that language absent extenuating circumstances. The ostensible
unity of language may lull parent parties and their lawyers into a
false belief that language differences are not an important issue.'
latter venture may be more prone to communications difficulties than ventures between
parents that use entirely different languages.
81. Communication in organizations is directly related to the development of ongoing
relationships within those organizations, because communication is an inextricable component of social processes. See Joanne Yates & Wanda J. Orlikowski, Genres of Organizational Communication: A StructurationalApproach to Studying Communication and Media,
17 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 299, 299 (1992) (discussing organizational communication as
"embedded in social process" and not "isolated rational action[]").
82. For a discussion of the contingency of texts in general, see Gerald Graff, Disliking
Books at an Early Age, LINGUA FRANCA, Sept.Oct. 1992, at 45. Graff explains, "As
readers we are necessarily concerned with both the questions posed by the text and the
questions we bring to it from our own differing interests and cultural backgrounds." Id. at
50. See also Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 726-30 (1990) (discussing the importance
of context in contractual interpretation).
83. In my discussion of contracting between heterolingual parties, I discuss both the
negotiation of terms and the division of control of the process of drafting those terms.
For discussion of the international dimensions of negotiation, see John L. Graham, CrossCultural Marketing Negotiations: A Laboratory Experiment, 4 MARKETING SCI. 130
(1985); John L. Graham, The Influence of Culture on the Process of Business Negotiations: An Exploratory Study, 16 L INT'L Bus. STUD. 79 (1985); John L. Graham & Roy
A. Herberger, Negotiators Abroad - Don't Shoot from the Hip, HARV. Bus. REV., JulyAug. 1983, at 160; Joyce Neu, American English Business Negotiations: Training for NonNative Speakers, 5 ENG. FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES 41 (1986).
84. Imperfect decision-making has been attributed to human cognitive limitations, particularly in information processing. See HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL AND
RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL SETTING 196-206 (1957) (discussing how the rational man model of decision-making should
be changed to reflect the limited cognitive ability of man). Language barriers can be
viewed as a layer added to these limitations. As such, their reduction or the amelioration
of their impact should improve decision quality in international joint ventures.
85. See supra note 80. Unity of language even within national borders is largely illusory. In Italy, for example, dialects other than Italian are spoken by a large part of the
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Domestic common law in the United States is illustrative of
attempts to resolve ambiguity in contracts. Primary rules of construction exist for the purpose of aiding interpretation. For example,
when subjective intention of the parties is not clearly manifested in
the contract, language is to be accorded its generally prevailing'
meaning6 Likewise, words of art and technical terms are to be
given their technical meaning when they are used by parties in a
technical field.87 Secondary rules of construction serve as "tiebreakers" to be used in the event that contract-specific interpreta-

tion is not possible. For example, when contractual provisions
cannot be clarified through the application of a generally accepted
meaning, ambiguities are interpreted against the party who drafted
the agreement. 8 Written provisions are favored over printed
ones, 89 and specific provisions are preferred to general provisions
with which they are inconsistent.' °
Primary rules of construction are superior to secondary rules
in resolution of ambiguity because they specifically address the
merits of a particular interpretive issue, whereas secondary rules
simply apply a generic default interpretation when more particularized efforts have failed.
Regardless of whether primary or secondary rules of interpretation apply, linguistic ambiguities may not be resolved as satisfactorily in shared-language international joint venture contracts as
they would in their domestic counterparts, because nuances of linguistic variance are magnified across cultures. 9 This propensity
population outside Florence and Tuscany. BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER TONGUE: ENGLISH
AND How IT GOT THAT WAY 38-39 (1990). Likewise, there are approximately 150 languages spoken in the former U.S.S.R. Id. at 39. The distinction between intranational and
international linguistic challenges is not a clean one, but rather a difference in degree and
the extent to which dialects tend to be related or unrelated.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(a) (1981) ("Unless a different intention is manifested, where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted
in acccordance with that meaning.").
87. Id. § 202(3)(b) ("Unless a different intention is manifested, technical terms and
words of art are given their technical meaning when used in a transaction within their
technical field.").
88. Id. § 206 ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party
who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.").
89. Id. § 203(d) ("[S]eparately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than
standardized terms or other terms not separately negotiated" in the interpretation of a
promise, agreement or term.).
90. Id. § 203(c) ("[I]n the intepretation of a promise, agreement or term, specific terms
and exact terms are given greater weight than general language.").
91. See supra note 80. Barbara Smith has observed that communication can never
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for interpretational difficulties is exacerbated by the inherently
unicultural orientation of the ordinarily superior primary rules of
interpretation. "Generally prevailing meanings" are less likely to
exist in the context of international contracts than in the context of
domestic contracts. As a result, both the drafting and the construction of cross-cultural contracts are especially thorny processes.92
Likewise, terms of art and technical terms are most likely to have
one relatively clear, widely shared meaning within the linguistic
context of one culture. Professions and disciplines that develop

separately across national borders usually experience many major
and minor variants in vocabulary development. 3 As a result of
these dynamics, both the development and later interpretation of
terms for international joint venture contracts are fraught with
potential difficulties.

A different set of linguistic challenges applies to international
joint venture contracting between parents using entirely different
languages. Subtleties of interpretation and cultural variation in the
meaning of identical words will be less important, though by no
means eliminated.' Because there are fewer identical words across

make what we call "knowledge" and "information" completely common in the sense of
creating perfect correlation of understanding. BARBARA H. SmiTH, CONTINGENCIES OF
VALmE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECIVES FOR CRITICAL THEORY 109 (1988). Smith attributes
the inevitable failure of communication to, inter alia, "inevitably different life histories as
verbal creatures." Id. Such disparities of verbal life history are cultural-linguistic artifacts,
magnified by international differences. Id.
92. In fact, the notion that "generally prevailing meanings" exist at all is questionable.
The idea that disputes can be resolved by resorting to some objective standard of analysis
evolved during the drafting of the original Restatement of Contracts as part of an effort
to establish stability and legal certainty as desirable objects in a commercial society.
Critics of an objective theory and approach to contracts suggest that the idea of
"generally prevailing meanings" is a myth that has been created to foster logistical ease
and consistency in contract interpretation, and may dispense with the subjective understandings and expectations of the parties. For a good discussion of objective and subjective theories of contract, see Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-69 (2d Cir.
1946).
93. For a discussion of the kinds of misunderstandings that can arise both between
languages and within one language spoken in different countries, see JACK ENEN, JR.,
VENTURING ABROAD: INTERNATIONAL BUsmSS EXPANSION VIA JOINT VENTURES 75
(1991) (discussing different meanings of words in American English and British English,
and the ways in which literal Japanese translation of informal American phrases can create misunderstanding).
94. Id. Even when parent companies use different languages, they may be subject to
varying interpretations of related words that often exist, for example, between two Romance languages or two Germanic languages. Moreover, the Americanization of many
languages has spurred the introduction of American English words into many world vocabularies. See BRYSON. supra note 85, at 180-95 (explaining that English words have
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languages than within a language, there are simply fewer opportunities for parties to attach different nuances of meaning to a single
term. Moreover, under conditions of disparity of language, use of

terms common to both parents is likely to stand out in stark relief.
It is easier for the parents to scrutinize the assumptions
they are
95
making in these limited instances of common usage.
Joint ventures contracts between different-language parents
present their own unique challenges. These begin with the drafting
process itself. Will the contract be drafted in a primary language,
then translated into a secondary language?96 Perhaps no formal
translation will be provided and one language will be deemed the
official language of the venture.' Or the process may be more

equitably collaborative, with initial drafts made in each language,
resulting in a final version which comes with negotiation from
these two starting points." If this more neutral process is used,
will the final contract be in one language or both languages? And,
regardless of the process used, if there are versions in each language, which will take precedence in the event of dispute or in the
case of ambiguity?" In the remainder of this section, I shall discuss separately the challenges of unilateral contract design and the
challenges of collaborative drafting.

been adopted into many other languages, including German, Japanese, and French).
95. International ventures with an American parent are particularly likely to encounter
Americanized usage in foreign languages. American parent companies should be aware
that the adaptation of such phrases into foreign languages still entails a process of translation and isolated cultural development, so that the American version and the foreign version may have different meanings. See BRYSON, supra note 85, at 180-95.
96. Venturing parents usually provide for translation into the secondary language when
the contract is drafted in an official, primary language. MICHAEL P. LrrKA, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINEss 125 (2d ed. 1991).
97. Given the Americanization of world languages, as well as the dominance of English in the educational systems of many countries and the relatively low emphasis on
foreign language training in the United States, the official language for venture pursuits
involving an American parent is likely to be English.
98. This dual-tiered process of contract drafting is much rarer than unilateral drafting
in an official, primary language. The discussion here is not descriptive of a widely established practice. Rather, dual-tiered contracting is discussed as an option which may avoid
some of the pitfalls of unilateral drafting.
99. Parents can designate one language version as the official document and the other
as a translation, exhibiting evidence of intent to render the former binding in the event of
subtle language distinctions. Another method of achieving this end is to utilize one contract and provide an unofficial translation to the parent who needs it. While this approach
may help resolve some disputes, it should not be viewed as dispositive in determining
differences in interpretation. Cases will exist in which unofficial translations more accurately embody the true nature of the agreement than documents designated as official.
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Unilateral Drafting

The choice taken among these varying options may have implications beyond the logistics of the contracting process itself. In
particular, choice of contract language can affect the balance of
power between parent companies, as well as the direction of venture implementation and the degree of managerial participation by
each parent. If the contract is initially drafted in one language
(hereinafter the "primary language," which will also be referred to
as the language of the "primary parent") and translated into the
other (hereinafter the "secondary language," which will also be
referred to as the language of the "secondary parent"), the following dynamics may result:
First, the primary parent will probably have more input into
the content of the contract. Because drafting contractual terms in a
foreign language makes meaningful participation in the drafting
process difficult, the secondary parent will have the incentive to

limit its participation to negotiation, trusting the primary parent to
incorporate results into the contract.I" ° Since the secondary parent
is naturally excluded from the drafting and revision process, that
parent will not ordinarily be present as issues arise in the process
of hammering out the body of the agreement."10 Ownership of
language is transformed into ownership of the drafting process. As
the primary parent dominates contract creation, the process be-

comes essentially unilateral. Decisions from which the secondary
100. The impediments to contracting which result from language barriers and unilateral
drafting are consistent with the theory that multinational entities are networks of transactions. CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLErr & SUMANTRA GHOSHAL, MANAGING ACROSS BORDERS:
THE TRANSNATIONAL SOLUrION 75-94 (1989); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THm ECONOMIC
INSTITUTONS OF CAPrALiSM 15-42 (1985).
Transaction costs are increased by language barriers, as disadvantaged parties must
spend time or money to reach minimal ability to use the primary language. These transaction costs will decrease the likelihood that the secondary party will be willing to invest
its resources in participating in the creation of contract content.
101. Any practicing attorney who has been engaged in contract drafting knows that
terms are refined after formal negotiations are settled, during the process of committing
oral understandings to written language. This occurs because the drafting process requires
a precision of thinking and verbalizing that raises questions beyond those identified during
more general pre-contract discussions. When the drafting process is not co-opted by one
party, the new questions that arise have the potential to improve the thoughtfulness and
effectiveness of the contract in meeting mutual expectations. When unilateral drafting resuits in one party's domination over the development of the agreement, the contract can
become lopsided, balanced in favor of the drafter. Partiality of contract terms is a significant component of the disparity of power that can result, potentially leading to discord or
dissatisfaction with the ultimate functioning of the joint venture.
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party is excluded will, realistically, tend to favor the primary party.
Second, the primary parent is likely to realize power benefits"ee by virtue of the advantage associated with contracting in
the primary language. 3 These benefits extend beyond the establishment of favorable contract terms. The secondary parent confers
a degree of trust upon a primary parent company that is drafting
the contract in the primary language." 4 That trust is a form of
dependency. The secondary party relies on the primary party to
draft negotiated provisions as accurately as possible and in good
faith. When questions unforeseen in the negotiation process arise
during the drafting stage, the secondary parent hopes that the primary parent will avoid the temptation to behave opportunistically
and will disclose the questions for secondary parent input."
The dependency inherent in the status of the secondary parent
increases the power of the primary parent. 6 The secondary

102. Power in negotiations is largely a function of position, authority, and knowledge.
All of these attributes are augmented by linguistic skill and dexterity, resulting in increased power relative to those lacking ability in the relevant language. For a more detailed discussion of the affect of position, authority, and knowledge on negotiation power,
see DONALD B. SPARKS, THE DYNAMICS OF EFFEcrivE NwoAnoN 99 (1982).
103. Corporate control is associated with knowledge flows, which are in part enhanced
by primary language advantages and the exclusive participation in contract development
that is likely to follow. For a discussion of the relationship between knowledge flows and
control, see Anil K. Gupta & Vijay Govindarajan, Knowledge Flows and the Structure of
Control Within Multinational Corporations, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 768 (1991).
104. See BOGGIANO, supra note 69, at 81. He states, [H]ow ignorant of a language
somebody may be is a question open to subtle distinctions the evidence of which is highly hazardous. Whoever enters the realm of a foreign language obviously assumes a risk
the extent of which greatly depends on how exotic the language is and therefore on the
difficulties of getting a proper translation. The obstacles to which Boggiano refers may be
understated, as he assumes that one can get a "proper translation" if one is willing to pay
the price. Whether there is such a thing as a "proper translation" is itself questionable,
and the reliance upon any translation puts a party at an inherent disadvantage.
105. The advantage of resolving unforeseen issues that arise in contracting is arguably
minimal, as the secondary parent will have the opportunity to review various drafts of the
contract before final approval. Yet the secondary party is disadvantaged in several ways
notwithstanding its ability to analyze drafts. Perhaps most importantly, the party that engages in the arduous process of contract drafting is more likely to have considered difficulties presented by various options and is therefore more likely to recognize subtle questions which may establish an advantage for one party or the other when resolved. Moreover, the secondary party is disadvantaged whether reviewing primary language or a translation into the secondary language. If the secondary party is reviewing a draft in the
primary language, comprehension is limited and recognition of subtle distinctions is greatly
impaired. If the secondary party is reviewing a draft translated into the secondary language, distinctions are lost as the natural result of the translation process itself.
106. Dependency and power are reciprocal concepts. To the extent that party A is dependent on party B for resources or favor, party B develops an incremdnt of power over
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parent's dependence on the primary parent to protect its interests
when obscure issues arise in the contracting process creates a bargaining chip. In return for objectivity in contract formation, the primary parent can expect more favorable treatment as the relationship
between the parents develops. The secondary parent is likely to
make substantive concessions to the primary parent, recognizing the
tacit power of the latter to exploit its superior familiarity with the
primary language. While the power of a primary parent in contracting may be covert and subtle, it is no less effective than a
more palpable advantage. As the secondary party experiences its
relative impairment in the utilization of a foreign language, the
delicate 7balance of power will shift in the direction of the drafting
1
parent. 0
Moreover, documentation in the primary language may evince
an intention of the parties to subject contract interpretation to the
law associated with the primary language." 8 Perhaps even more
significantly, choice of contractual language may be used by a
court to infer choice of laws regarding any contractual litigation."t 9 While this resolution of conflict of laws questions may
conceivably favor the secondary party under some circumstances,
the primary party is more likely to receive the advantage. The
primary party will be more familiar with the basic approach of its
own legal system, as well as its particular doctrines. When negotiating terms that are likely to be interpreted under its own laws, the
primary party therefore has better access to and understanding of
information than the secondary party. Decisions reached under
these conditions will tend to favor the primary parent.
Third, contrary to the secondary rules of construction, ambigu-

party A.
107. The ability to employ attorneys or other agents who are fluent in the primary
language will achieve some mitigation of these effects but cannot substitute for a
principal's familiarity with contractual language. The ability of agents to act on behalf of
their principals is imperfect by virtue of human limitations of empathy. Furthermore, the
addition of a layer of vigilance which separates the principal from the agent adds a degree of potential for error in recognizing issues of contracting that are crucial to the
principal's particular interests. While agents can act effectively as safety nets or secondary
screens for the identification of contracting issues, their role as exclusive primary-language
interpreters puts the secondary party at a disadvantage.
108. LrTKA, supra note 96, at 125. See also BOGGIANO, supra note 69, at 88 ("Construction of the rules of construction should also be governed by the proper law of the

contract.").
109. Henry P. de Vries, Choice of Language in International Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL CoNTRAcTs: CHoIcE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE 17, 17-19 (Willis L.M. Reese ed.,
1962).
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ities in the resulting contract may be interpreted in favor of the
drafting party. Normally, under American laws, a court will attempt
to resolve ambiguities by adopting the usual or standard meaning
of terms," 0 or by reference to the intentions manifested by the
parties under the specific conditions of contracting."' If all efforts
to determine intended meaning are depleted without resolving the
ambiguity, a secondary rule of interpretation favors construing the
contract against the party which drafted it, or contra proferentum
("against the profferor")." Because the drafting party has control
over the contracting process and the opportunity to avoid ambiguity, construction against the drafter is supported in part by an element of fairness."' Moreover, since a drafting party generally enjoys a superior ability to protect its own interests, failure to do so
may be a manifestation of intent to draft the term in favor of the
non-drafting party." 4
This rule of construction is weak where secondary parties to

contracts drafted by primary parties are concerned. And, perhaps
most crucially, the doctrine is less likely to be applied in interna-

tional settings than in domestic contract cases. As a secondary rule
of construction, interpretation against the drafter is only evoked
when evidence of actual intent is lacking."'

As the exclusive

drafter of a contract in the primary language, the primary party
develops ownership of virtually all intent with regard to the choice
of language when creating the terms of the contract. All evidence
regarding what was meant by a particular phrase will be provided
by the drafting party, who also has a great advantage in fashioning
arguments regarding the possible and likely meanings of ambiguous
terms. When the secondary party attempts to argue the intended
meaning of a phrase, it argues from logic rather than from actual
experience, essentially stating, "X should mean this" rather than
"When I chose the word X it was because it means this."
In cross-linguistic situations, the secondary party also argues

110. See supra note 86.
111. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JoSPEH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 165-72 (3d
ed. 1987) (discussing various standards used in interpreting a contract and what evidence
may be allowed in applying the standard of interpretation selected).
112. See supra note 88.
113. For a discussion of the reasoning behind the rule of construction which favors
interpretation against the party who provided the language at issue, see North Gate Corp.
v. National Food Stores, Inc., 140 N.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Wis. 1966).
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
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from a position of rhetorical inferiority" 6 and must rely on the
testimony of language experts. These experts can only testify regarding generalities and tendencies in language use, whereas the
primary parent can provide a history of drafting supported by close
personal experience with the language chosen. As a result, the
primary party has great opportunity to persuade the court of its
drafting intentions, blocking the application of the secondary rule
that favors construction against the drafter.
Of course, the secondary party can argue that the intent of
negotiations and oral understandings of terms favors interpreting
contractual language in its favor, but the impediments to this line
of reasoning are significant. Since a written contract is generally
viewed as'a final arbiter of disagreements and misunderstandings,
the use of oral evidence of negotiations to decide the meanings of
a writing is often viewed as tautological and backwards. The contract is meant to finalize and formalize the agreement, so the use
of less formalized oral evidence to determine its meaning is considered retrograde. The preference for textual interpretation over evidence of pre-drafting behaviors and understandings has been formalized in doctrines like the parol evidence rule, which limits the
use of extrinsic evidence in the construction of integrated written
contracts." 7
B.

Collaborative Drafting

An entirely distinct set of challenges may arise if parents
using different languages agree to collaborate in the contracting
process. Collaboration is likely to entail the formulation of a contract in two languages which will eventually be negotiated into one
final form. This official, finalized contract may be formally adopted
in either one or both languages. Dual-language, dual track contract

116. Donald Sparks has observed that dual language usage "clearly indicates recognition
of and respect for the other party .. . [and] conveys acceptance as an equal:' SPARKS,
supra note 102, at 147. Conversely, unilateral linguistic control establishes conditions of
what I am labelling "rhetorical inferiority'
117. For a classic common law explanation of the parol evidence rule, see Gianni v. R.

Russel & Co., 126 A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924). For a statutory explication, see U.C.C. § 2202 (1992).
Formal rules disfavoring oral evidence regarding written contracts, such as the parol
evidence rule, are usually considered inapplicable to the resolution of contractual ambiguities. Yet even when there is ambiguity, our proclivity is to favor drafting intent over
negotiating intent. The primary party's assertion of intent in choosing terms is generally
considered more compelling than a secondary party's statements concerning its understanding of intent at the time of negotiation.
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development has both strengths and weaknesses relative to the
primary language approach discussed in the previous section. The
potential benefits and potential disadvantages of dual-language
development are considered separately in the following paragraphs.
1. Benefits of Dual-Language Contract Development
a. Mitigation of Power Disparities in Negotiation
Dual-language contract development is likely to mitigate power
disparities in the negotiation of terms. When the contract is developed through the proposals of each parent and formulated in the
language to which that parent is accustomed, neither partner has
the advantage of presenting potentially skewed terms on its home
turf.' Since there is no dominant party in this regard, the parents have greater potential to negotiate on equal terms." 9 The
contract which results is more likely to reflect the proposals and
counter-proposals made by both parents, resulting in greater potential for fairness of terms. Opportunism of a dominant parent is
circumvented as the parties bargain from positions of relative parity.
b.

Increased Likelihood of Venture Survival

Dual-language contract development may also increase the
likelihood of venture survival. If the contract is drafted in the
language of each parent, the meaningful participation of both is
facilitated. When both parents are involved in contract formulation
as well as preliminary negotiation of terms, several benefits are
likely to obtain which may improve probabilities of venture surviv20
al. 1

118. Technical language adopted by large organizations, or "bureaucratese," is difficult to
understand outside of its context, which is rarely explained to those who are not involved
in the drafting process. This results in the adaptation of a "prestige dialect' that excludes
and mystifies outsiders. Veda R. Charrow, Language in the Bureaucracy, in 8 ADVANCES
IN DISCOURSE PROCESSES: LINGUiSTICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 173, 186-87 (Robert Di
Pietro ed., 1982). When the drafting process is collaborative or when neither of two languages is given preferential treatment, opportunities to exert power through language intimidation are reduced.
119. Experts on negotiations emphasize the importance of using objective criteria in
reconciling parties' interests. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLAM URY, GETrING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 84-86 (1988) (explaining that negotiating
on the basis of objective criteria is effective because it is independent of the will of
either side). Dual-tier, dual-language drafting enhances the objective nature of contracting
by removing the territorial advantage conferred by unilateral language dominance.
120. Extension of the number of persons who participate in managerial decision-making
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Perhaps most crucially, the balance of power reflected by joint
participation in drafting reduces the potential for opportunistic
behavior where the negotiated expectations become warped or
altered when transposed into contract language. 21 Because the
agreement which results from mutual participation will tend to be
kept truer to the parents' pre-contractual verbal understandings, the
final document should be a more faithful representation of the real
essence of the negotiated deal. As the implementation of the venture unfolds, there will be fewer unpleasant surprises related to any
schisms between informal understanding and formalized contract.
Disputes are less likely to arise when the contract accurately reflects the expectations the parties developed when the deal was
being processed. This enhanced likelihood of harmony between
parents is beneficial to venture survival and increases the chance

that the parents will be satisfied with the collaboration as it unfolds."
In addition to increasing the accuracy of the contract as a
reflection of the parties' understanding, dual-language drafting and
concomitant dual-parent participation allows the parents to process
cultural and linguistic misunderstandings before venture implementation begins and before the parties are officially bound to pursue
the venture at all. As the parties address the complexities involved
in reducing expectations to the precision of language, they will

discover areas of potential contention which would remain obscured
if one party were removed from the rigors of contracting. The

has been observed to have a number of positive effects on a business venture including:
participant satisfaction, additional informational input, improved understanding of the decisions based on involvement in maldng them, clarification of communications channels, and
increases in both motivation and commitment. For a discussion of these and other positive
effects of involvement in decision-making, see ROBERT C. FORD ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL
THEORY: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 162-63 (1988).
121. A good negotiation process reduces or eliminates both the prospects for and the
desirability of opportunistic behavior. Fisher and Ury suggest that parties seek common
ground, finding opportunities to negotiate for "mutual gain." FISHER & URY, supra note
119, at 73. When the parties are both full participants in the continued negotiations that
take place during contract drafting, parity of power creates controls against opportunistic
temptations and increases the chance of finding the common goals which will support the
venture as it is implemented.
For an excellent and detailed discussion of the process of creating value through
joint gains, see DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR
88-116 (1986).
122. The negotiation literature refers to the importance of mutual satisfaction in the
ultimate contract in terms of coordination benefits. For a good discussion of the role of
coordination in high quality contract negotiations, see DEAN G. PRurrr, NEGOTIATION
BEHAVIOR 91-135 (1981).
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resulting product tends to be a contract that has been thoroughly
examined, encouraging resolution of areas of potential conflict in
advance. In the process, impediments to smooth venture implementation are reduced.
c.

Improved Quality of Managerial Decisionmaking

Dual-language contract development can also improve the

quality of managerial decision-making at the start of the venture. In
fact, participation in formal processes of contracting should be
viewed as having value beyond that added to the quality of the
contract itself."u Contracting is a potentially strategic process as

well as a legal process aimed at forming a binding document.
Contracting forces parties to think in advance about important
questions which are likely to arise well into the future of the venture. This kind of thinking is strategic in nature, as both business
strategy and contract formulation are concerned with long-range
development of relations and expectations between parties."
While participation in contracting can always be seen as a
useful strategic exercise entirely apart from legal considerations, its
strategic value in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic contexts is particularly compelling. The dual-language contracting process and
resulting parity of participation increase the pool of ideas and
alternatives from which decisions are derived." In a transnational
setting, the augmentation of the pool of alternatives is vitally important. Each party is guided by cultural biases and limitations and
thus lacks independent access to important considerations which are
simply non-existent in their individual worlds. 24 The usual incre123. This is not to imply that improvement in the quality of decisions reflected in the
contract itself is unimportant. Any parent considering gains in power through control over
the contract process should be aware of tradeoffs in the reduced likelihood that the venture will be mutually satisfactory. See Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, Negotiating Rationally: The Power and Impact of the Negotiator's Frame, EXECtJTtVE, Aug. 1992,
at 42, 43 (suggesting that the goal of negotiating contract terms should be the attainment
of a good agreement).
124. See Steven R. Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as Strategic Tools, 25 IND. L. REV.
397 (1991) (examining the similarities between contract drafting and strategy formulation,
and contending that managerial participation in the former will have positive spillover
effects on the latter).
125. C.f L. Richard Hoffman & Norman R.F. Maier, Valence in the Adoption of Solutions by Problem Solving Groups: Quality and Acceptance As Goals of Leaders and
Members, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 175, 177 (1967) (discussing how in a
study of groups given a problem and told to reach the best solution, the group satisfaction with the adopted solution seemed to be peculiar to the unique character of the process in that particular group).
126. Often these considerations are linguistic ones which may affect the ability to trans-
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ments to decision quality which can be obtained by increasing the
numbers of inputs are magnified when these inputs reflect varying
perspectives, as when the inputs are culturally divergent. From a

strategic standpoint, international joint venture contracting which
encourages mutual participation also encourages realistic terms that
are acceptable under culturally distinctive norms, expectations and
values. The overall result of collaborative drafting will be an en-

hancement of the quality of the contract as a tool for the growing,
developing relationship between two distinctive parties in a highly
idiosyncratic setting.
2. Disadvantages of Dual-Language Contract Development
a. Inadequate Integration of Parallel Efforts
Dual-language contract development can result in a two-tier
system of contracts. If both parents are to participate in the con-

tract development process through parallel efforts in separate languages, they must ensure that these logistically separate efforts are
integrated." Because language barriers tend to separate this kind
of contract development into two discrete processes, it is especially
easy for parent companies that are attempting to gain parity of
input and power to find themselves with two differing contracts

that may contain inconsistencies and conflicts.
In order to avoid developing different versions in isolation,
parent companies may meet frequently during the drafting process

or they may attempt to reconcile their drafts in one final, intensive
round of negotiations. The former option is more likely to retain
form domestic product-market segments into international ones. Reinhold Aman observes,
for example, that names of products may have inadvertently offensive meanings when
translated into other languages. Reinhold Aman, Interlingual Taboos in Advertising: How
Not to Name Your Product, in ADVANCES IN DIsCOuRSE PROCESSES: LINGUISTICS AND
THE PRO'ESSIONS 215, 219-21 (Robert Di Pietro ed., 1982). If the contractual terms are
highly detailed, these kinds of language-related complications can be noted earlier as the
information of both parents is incorporated into contracting through the use of a twotiered system.
127. There is a unilateral drafting alternative that can be used to avoid the difficulties
of integrating two drafts into one cohesive agreement while reducing the power disparity
normally associated with one-sided contract formation. This alternative is labelled in the
negotiations literature as "one-text procedure." One-text contracting entails the use of a
single draft in order to avoid confusion and exacerbation of bargaining differences that are
magnified when parties attempt to move from two partisan drafts to a single cooperative
form. The one-text approach avoids language dependency by choosing a neutral third party
to engage in the drafting process. While one-text contracting incurs the additional cost of
hiring an independent drafter, it may be an effective means of reconciling the strengths
and weaknesses of unilateral drafting. FISHER & URY, supra note 119, at 118-22.
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some of the benefits discussed earlier. By comparing progress regularly during the course of parallel drafting, the parents have sufficient time to examine each segment for inconsistencies. Likewise,
frequent coordination should enhance the strategic utilization of
contracting as a tool for planning, as the parents work step by step
to resolve disagreements and to consider one another's viewpoints
and perspectives. These procedures can be undermined when detailed, completed drafts are the first and only stage for comparison.
In addition, the use of steps will enhance coordination and allow a
number of feedback loops so that information and decisions from
each meeting can be processed in the remaining tasks. When the
parties complete an entire draft before comparing their products,
they lose an opportunity to incorporate knowledge gained in the
course of drafting.
b.

Increased Conflicts

A two-tier system of contracts may increase the likelihood of
disagreements between parent parties based on conflicts between
different-language versions of the contract. To understand the relationship between two-tiered drafting and the probability of disagreement, consider current criticism of the old fallacy embodied in
the "plain meaning rule."'" Both the Uniform Commercial
Code 29 and the Second Restatement of Contracts 3 ' have recognized that language is never clear and unambiguous, and therefore
can never yield to interpretation of "one plain meaning." Meaning
is contingent upon the "'surrounding circumstances,' including the
persons, objects, and events to which the words can be applied and
which caused the words to be used."'' Unfortunately, variance in
the context and circumstances of speech will contain more error
when two separately drafted contract versions are eventually collapsed into one, especially when the drafts are originally conceived
in different languages. The myth of plain meaning loses another
increment of credibility when the variables of language and culture
are incorporated into interpretation through two-tiered drafting. In

128. The plain meaning rule says, "if a writing, or the term in question, appears to be
plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four comers
of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature." CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 111, at 166-67.
129. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 2 (1992).
130. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs §§ 200-204 (1981).
131. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs 225 n.74 (1960 & Supp. 1992).
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any event, whether a two-tiered approach to contracting results in
one official version in a language of choice or two official translacan lead to later
tions, the process of parallel contract development
3
1
construction.
and
interpretation
of
conflicts
The parties may decide to adopt either language as the "official language" of the contract. This decision reflects an intent to
elevate one version to a more definitive status. The decision may
be made based on advantages held by the party whose language is
thus elevated or may simply be part of a broader system of give
and take as the prospective parents each gain various advantages
and make various concessions. The establishment of an official
language version is likely to ameliorate some but not all of the
potential conflict arising from dual-tier drafting. To some extent the
elevated official version may be considered definitive, thereby
circumventing potential disagreements. Yet the official language
version can never be truly dispositive of all issues, since the construction of the contract relies so heavily on evidence of intent
which is manifested by both drafts in a dual-tiered system. Areas
of divergence that are masked by misunderstanding or misinterpretation across languages and cultural assumptions create potential errors between versions of the draft and are incremental sources of
conflict arising from collaborative drafting. These sources of conflict will increase in severity if the parties decline to choose an
official language version, leaving two official translations which
can never be entirely consistent.
c. Misaligned Strategic Approaches
A two-tiered system of contracts which are not perfectly
aligned may also result in misaligned strategic approaches to the
venture's purposes and modes of operations. Language barriers that
encourage parents to develop separate versions of strategy in isolation may result in two separate and distinctive strategies.' While the
democratic character of two-tiered contract development will tend
to decrease power disparities, it encourages inconsistencies between
the parents' stated goals, objectives, and expectations.'

132. While the distinction between interpretation and construction has been ignored in
recent contract jurisprudence, it is an important one. Interpretation is the search for the
parties' intended meaning, whereas construction is the use of rules to attach a legally
binding meaning to the generic terms. Interpretation of subjective meaning will more
reliably yield just results than construction of legal effect.
133. A good joint venture contract depends largely on good negotiation processes both
prior to drafting and during the drafting period, as the exercise of committing understand-
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These strategic inconsistencies can undermine the effectiveness
of the joint venture."M Dual-tiered contracts can act as strategic
roadmaps leading the venture in conflicting directions, especially if
the venture is jointly managed by representatives of both parent
firms. As a result, management may find itself internally disjointed,
which inadvertently or purposefully frustrates the movement of the
venture in a unified direction.
While the eventual reunification of two-tiered drafts into a
final, official version of the contract will reduce inconsistencies in
managerial expectations, it cannot dispose of them entirely. The
ratification of a final contract has limited powers of reconciliation
because the document itself is the smaller and less compelling part
of a contract. The understandings that develop in relation to the
document, which can only be imperfectly encompassed therein, are
the richer product of contracting. When the parties draft a contract
on parallel tiers those understandings are insular, like species of an
organism evolving separately on different islands. The strategies
that develop during the contracting period are unavoidably detached
from one another under the two-tiered approach.
Late reconciliation of separately developed drafts into one
final, unified version implies a meager concept of contracting in
which the document itself is the goal. A richer view of contracting
envisions the possibility of creating value for the venture by emphasizing the process of planning over the achievement of a legally
binding document. This is a relational approach which focuses on
the benefits of negotiating. The contract is seen more as a means
of solidifying the affiliation and affinity between parents than as a
legal tool for the protection of rights.'35 To gain potential rela-

ings to paper evokes new questions and concerns.
The negotiations upon which the contract depends will result in superior managerial
decisions if both sides understand one another's philosophies and communicate clearly and
often. See GERALD 1. NIERENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF NEGOTIATING 216 (1987) (emphasizing the need for parties to share philosophies in corporate negotiations, as well as
strategic emphases and directions).
Dual-tier contracting segregates the parties, who in a more integrated process would
have more opportunities to reach a genuine understanding. The result can be strategic
inconsistencies that undermine the venture's success.
134. By nature and definition, an effective strategy requires a degree of consistency. See
BRUCE D. HENDERSON, THE LOGIC OF BUSINESS STRATEGY 39 (1984) ('[Strategy involves foresight, commitment of resources, coordination of efforts, and analysis that go far
beyond the intuition and conditioned reflexes of the ad hoc expediency of day-to-day
competition . . . [and results in] a cohesive, tightly reasoned conceptual framework.").
135. The use of contracts to protect rights and provide remedies for wrongs is a clas-
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tional benefits of joint venture contracting, the parents must
engage
36
communications.
opens
that
process
planning
in a single
3.

Tradeoffs Between Unilateral and Collaborative Drafting

Tradeoffs inevitably exist between unilateral and bilateral
drafting processes because of the benefits and disadvantages of
each process.
To summarize the above discussion, when one party is given
exclusive responsibility for developing the written contract, the
venture will tend to be characterized by: (i) subjectivity of contract
content in favor of the drafting party; (ii) power disparity in favor
of the drafting party; (iii) interpretation of ambiguities in favor of
the drafting party; (iv) limited quality of managerial decision-making based on relative scarcity of input; (v) cohesiveness of contractual language and concepts; (vi) reduction of venture effectiveness
and survival prognosis because of gaps between informal understandings and the formal contract; (vii) augmentation of venture
effectiveness and survival prognosis because of relative cohesiveness of the formal contract; and (viii) alignment of parental approaches to strategy. When the parties collaborate in the drafting
process, the venture will tend to be characterized by: (i) objectivity
of content, such that the contractual language is more likely to
represent a reasonable understanding of the agreement rather than
one party's skewed interpretation of the agreement; (ii) parity of
power between venture parents; (iii) relatively neutral interpretation
of ambiguities; (iv) enhanced quality of managerial decision-making
based on a variety of inputs representative of parental concerns; (v)
non-cohesiveness of contractual language and concepts; (vi) augmentation of venture effectiveness and survival prognosis because
of consonance between informal understandings and formal contract; (vii) reduction of venture effectiveness and survival prognosis

sical use, while the utilization of contracts to enhance cooperative endeavors is a relational

application. For a detailed discussion of the differences among classical, neoclassical, and
relational forms of contracting, see Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw.

U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
136. Planning benefits a venture by: reducing uncertainty, setting direction, identifying
critical issues and success factors, institutionalizing analysis and creativity, providing coordination, optimizing the allocation and utilization of resources, increasing responsiveness
to change, creating performance measures, and controlling the destiny of the enterprise.
HAL., supra note 58, at 10. Effective contracting shares many of the same goals and can
serve as a significant planning tool if the parents engage in unified contract negotiations
throughout a single drafting process.
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because of relative incohesiveness of the formal contract; and (viii)
misalignment of parental approaches to strategy.
As these lists of attributes illustrate, neither unilateral nor
bilateral drafting is preferable per se, because neither is perfect and
the options involve inevitable trade-offs. In choosing a method of
contracting, parents of prospective international ventures must assess the importance of the factors listed above relative to the
venture's goals and its strengths and weaknesses. 37 Once a uni-

lateral or bilateral mode is chosen, the parties should be vigilant to
avoid the pitfalls which tend to be associated with the chosen
course.
IV.

CULTURAL CHALLENGES OF CONTRACTING: THE COMPLEXITIES OF DIVERSITY AND HETEROGENEITY

If we define international joint ventures in terms of diversity

of predominant national affiliation, then virtually all such endeavors
must address the concerns raised by cultural variation.'
Since
the parent companies of international ventures are, by definition,
foreign to one another, expectations of venture owners will always
arise out of different cultural contexts.'39 If both owners partici-

pate in control of the venture, cultural variability will extend as
well to the level of management."4 Whether this inevitable disparity is confined to the parents' equity interests, or extends to
operations and control, it is a crucial consideration in determining

137. This assessment is best accomplished using a tool developed in strategic management theory called a "SWOT Analysis," in which strengths and weaknesses of the organization are viewed in light of environmental opportunities and threats in order to determine
objectives and general direction. For a more detailed explanation of the use of SWOT
Analysis, see LLOYD L. BYARs, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: FORMULATION AND IMPLEMEN-

36 (3d ed. 1991).
138. Cultural divergence between parents may in turn impair the development of a unified corporate culture in the venture. Corporate culture comprises the system of values
and beliefs shared within the organization, and is an important component of its external
adaptation and its ultimate survival. Edgar H. Schein, Coming to a New Awareness of
Organizational Culture, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1984, at 3, 9. Parental resolution of
potential conflict and misunderstanding founded upon cultural differences is an important
precursor to the building of a viable joint venture culture.
139. Sensitivity to cultural differences is an important component of international joint
venture success. "The best global companies overcome ethnocentrism." Joan M. Feldman,
TATION

Managing Across Borders: Airlines, 29 AiR TRANSPORT WORLD 40, 41 (1992) (statement

of Paul Misfud, general counsel of KLM-U.S.A.).
140. For a discussion of the managerial issues of culture in multinational enterprises, see
Philip M. Rosenzweig & Jitendra V. Singh, OrganizationalEnvironments and the Multinational Enterprise, 16 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 340 (1991).
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the best approach to venture contracting. 4 '
A.

Cultural Challenges in Contract Negotiations

At the contract negotiation stage, American parents should be
sensitive to variations in negotiation patterns across cultures. One
commentator has observed, for example, that Germanic cultures
tend to approach negotiations in a thorough, systematic, but sometimes rigid manner." Negotiations in this context may require a
high degree of preparation, as well as clarity and precision in
communications. 43 French and Belgian negotiators are observed
to engage in "lateral" negotiations, preferring to discuss general
philosophical issues prior to considering the particulars. 1" The
commentator notes that British negotiators are relatively informal
and enter contract bargaining in an undogmatic but sometimes
underprepared manner. 45 British partners of joint ventures are, as
a result, likely to be flexible and open to suggestions.'" Japanese
negotiations may appear tediously slow to Americans, who may
become impatient and press their co-venturers too aggressively
towards resolution. 47 Japanese negotiation depends upon the
building of a close personal rapport.'48 American partners often
view the development of sympathy and affinity as superfluous and
even harmful in light of the American contractual goal of depersonalizing relations.'49 On entering negotiations, American parents
must be aware of nuances in differing approaches to bargaining,
and should try to understand the other party's expectations in regard to the process.
After terms and conditions for the venture have been negotiat-

141. See Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Considerations in Designing
Joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 253, 268-70 (examining a number of
variables that affect the optimum joint venture contracting modes, including the variable of
cultural disparity).
142. Sergey Frank, Global Negotiating: Vive les Differences, SALES

& MARKETING

MGMT., May 1992, at 64.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 66.
145. IL
146. Id.
147. Richard W. Wright, Joint Venture Problems in Japan, CoLtrM. J. WORLD Bus.,
Spring 1979, at 25, 27.
148. Id.
149. The goal of the classical American contract is to standardize relations between the
parties and fix all idiosyncracy within the parameters of common law doctrines. For a
discussion of the nature and characteristics of classical contract doctrine, see Macneil,
supra note 135, at 856-65.
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ed, American companies typically turn the process over to attorneys, whose drafting of elaborate and detailed contracts is considered to be a matter of course.'50 Venture partners from other

countries, however, may be uncomfortable with this progression.
For example, Mexican business culture requires the erection of a

preliminary foundation of personal relationships upon which coventurers build.15 Personal trust and confidence are precursors to
venture contracting in Mexico, 5 where Americans who view

contract as a legal guarantor of trustworthiness may be viewed with
suspicion for wanting to expedite legal forms without sufficient

personal interaction.
Likewise, Japanese business people often rely on mutual trust

to the exclusion of formal contracting.'

They have traditionally

viewed the need to contract as a lack of good faith, potentially
injuring future relations between venture parents.' Reliance on
trust as a substitute for formal contracting requires either strong
cultural norms, under which trust is so institutionalized in business
as to be a viable proxy for contract, 55 or a history of ongoing
relations between the particular parties considering the joint venture
option, such that mutual parental confidence and faith compensates
for a generic cultural environment of mistrust.'56 Therefore, where

150. For a discussion of the use of attorneys at this stage in American joint venture
contracting, see Salbu, supra note 124, at 407-11.
151. "Virtually the entire context of the Mexican business culture is one based on relationships and, as a result, the preliminary foundation on which a relationship is built is
often at the core of any successful business enterprise in Mexico." Mears, supra note 12,
at 625.
152. Id at 625-26.
153. "Japanese business people consider mutual trust between the trading partners, which
can only be developed by a long-term relationship, most important Legal contracts are
usually considered as suppletory, and complicated, long contracts may even be considered
harmful." Shishido, supra note 7, at 88.
154. l at 87.
155. A cultural foundation of trust may exist when Japanese finms enter joint ventures
with one another, but may be missing when they join in a venture with American parents
who are part of a litigious society in which the contract is traditionally viewed as a device which acts as a proxy for trust.
156. The establishment of a relationship sufficient to justify mutual parental trust is advisable whenever feasible because trust may be an effective proxy for contract in cultures
where contract is viewed with suspicion, and because long courtships have been associated
with chances for joint venture success. See David Lei & John W. Slocum, Global Strategic Alliances: Payoffs and Pitfalls, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, winter 1991, at 44, 55
(noting that because of their emphasis on harmony and trust, the Japanese dislike the
inclusion of "divorce clauses," clauses that deal with the termination of the venture, in
contracts at the inception of the venture).
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the partner's culture is resistant to formal contracting, it may be
advisable to replace formal contracting processes with negotiation
and planning processes.
B.

Cultural Considerations in Choice of Joint Venture

Management
Culturally heterogeneous management may benefit group decisionmaking processes. Culturally homogeneous top management
teams tend to encourage group cohesiveness,157 potentially causing

a team to value consensus over rational discussion, conflict, and
ultimate quality of decision."8 Heterogeneity in the management
team may decrease the likelihood that decisions are undermined by
groupthink 5 9 and therefore avert the tendency of homogeneous
groups to equate consensus with correctness of judgment."6 Joint
venture management teams representing the different cultures of

parent firms can increase the pool of perspectives from which
group decisions are made,'

while discouraging the excessive co-

hesiveness which tends to subvert decision quality.
A diverse pool of perspectives, including representation from
the cultures of countries in which business is to be transacted, is a
compelling benefit to be derived from shared parental management.
For example, global marketing techniques may be used to advertise

products in several countries of divergent cultures. Global marketing techniques attempt to find common ground among the distinc-

tive populations of different nations, in order to achieve efficiencies
and economies. 62 International joint ventures may be formed in

157. See Charles A. O'Reilly I1 et al., Work Group Demography, Social Integration,
and Turnover, 34 ADmiN. SCL Q. 21, 33 (1989) (stating that homogeneity in groups will
increase social integration while lowering turnover).
158. Sim B. Sitkin & Amy L. Pablo, Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior, 17 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 9, 20 (1992).
159. See IRVING L. JANis, Vicr ms oF GROUPIINK (1972) (discussing the tendency of
groups to value consensus and harmony over vigorous, divisive debate, and the harmful
effects of this tendency on the quality of group decisions).
160. See Sitkin & Pablo, supra note 158.
161. Cultural heterogeneity of management teams may, for example, improve the
venture's ability to create culturally and geographically differentiated marketing strategies
for optimal effectiveness in divergent locations. See Frank, supra note 142, at 64 (observing, "Mhe company that attempts to jump into world markets indiscriminately - without
tailoring its business, negotiating, and marketing approach to individual foreign markets will suffer the same fate as other undifferentiated marketing efforts: a lot of time and
money spent on mediocre results.").
162. For a discussion of global marketing in general, see John A. Quelch & Edward J.
Hoff, Customizing Global Marketing, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1986, at 59.

1262

CASE WFSTERW RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1221

order to facilitate global marketing efforts, or may be formed as
part of another strategic agenda. 63 While global marketing has
provided advertising efficiencies for some companies,'" it has
failed for companies that have misunderstood important cultural

differences."

Shared management of an international joint ven-

ture which includes representatives of both parents, and therefore

both cultures, will have a wider base of information from which to
recognize important differences in how assorted people transact
business. This enriched information base provides a foundation for

better decisionmaking in all areas which, like global marketing
initiatives, rely on accurate and perceptive understanding of subtle

cultural distinctions.
While cultural heterogeneity may improve the quality of decisions, it is the source of some costs and can create obstacles to
venture effectiveness. For example, although the allocation of human resources to culturally unfamiliar venues provides opportunities
for individual growth and breadth of perspective, adjustment and
assimilation into novel environments can be challenging and even
traumatic for workers." When employees and managers fail to
make these difficult adjustments the venture incurs expense in the
form of the ineffectiveness of poorly assimilated workers 67 or in
163. For a discussion of joint venture arrangements for international marketing purposes,
see Robert E. Weigand, Marketing Through Foreign Subsidiaries and Joint Venture Arrangements, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN MARKETING 106 (Victor P. Buell ed., 2d ed.
1986).
164. See Ken Wells, Selling to the World: Global Ad Campaigns, After Many Missteps,
Finally Pay Dividends, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1992, at Al, A8 (discussing the successful
global marketing strategy of Levi-Strauss, which films all of its semi-annual global jeans
commercials in Los Angeles over two weeks and stating that, compared to former marketing practices of filming different commercials separately and within local markets, centralization and globalization are extremely efficient).
165. l at A8 (citing as an example, Proctor and Gamble's global advertisement featuring a man in a bathroom while his wife sat in the bathtub that was effective in Great
Britain and France, but not in Japan, where the commercial was seen as distasteful. Proctor and Gamble admitted that the blunder might have been avoided "had a Japanese woman been running its campaign there.").
166. Some transitions are more difficult than others, depending on the degree of disparity between the two cultures in question. See Mark Mendenhall & Gary R. Oddou, The
Dimensions of Expatriate Acculturation: A Review, 10 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 39, 43 (1985)
(suggesting that "cultural toughness," or idiosyncracies in various cultures' receptiveness to
assimilation, may explain varying degrees of difficulty in adjusting to relocation). See also
Austin T. Church, Sojourner Adjustment, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 540, 547 (1982) (positing a
"cultural distance" theory, which states that difficulties in adjusting to a new culture are
positively correlated with the degree of conceptual distance between the new culture and
the home culture).
167. For a detailed discussion of the dynamics related to ease or difficulty of intema-
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the form of money spent to relocate and replace the worker.
When parents choose to support a diversity of perspectives by
establishing a heterogeneous management team comprised of participants from both nations, each abdicates a degree of control. This
relinquishment of complete control by each parent will make it
relatively easy for the venture to become independent and autonomous. Since neither parent has total power over the venture, a field
of discretion inevitably develops. This discretion tends to breed
venture independence. Parents considering heterogeneous venture
management must assess the desirability of an increased likelihood
of venture autonomy.
Harrigan has observed that substantial venture autonomy may
lead to termination of the venture, particularly through its reformulation into a stand-alone entity.'68 While independence of ventures
from parental ownership is not necessarily bad, it may undermine
some important strategic goals typical of international co-venturers.
Consider, for example, American companies that have sought entry
into foreign markets, usirg the joint venture form either because of
governmental restrictions or to exploit a partner's established linkages and capabilities. Such companies may discover that a newly
independent venture functions as an undesired competitor with
early entry advantages. A parent in this position must also bear the
expense of breaking into the market a second time.
Despite the risk that significant autonomy will lead to ultimate
loss of ownership of the venture, many strategic consultants see
autonomy as increasingly necessary for joint venture success. Peter
Schavoir, Director of Strategy at IBM, states, "Autonomy is
emerging as an important ingredient for success in alliances because it allows a new venture to adapt to its particular market
instead of aping the practices of its parents."' 69 In fact, one study
reveals that successful ventures experience dramatic change in their
first few years.Y° Venture autonomy is a form of decentralization
of decision-making which increases the entity's responsiveness to
change' and its overall effectiveness.

tional' adjustment, see J. Stewart Black et al., Toward a Comprehensive Model of International Adjustment: An Integration of Multiple Theoretical Perspectives, 16 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 291 (1991).
168. HARRIGAN, supra note 57, at 334.
169. Sherman, supra note 2, at 78.
170. Id.
171. See LAWRENCE B. MOHR, EXPLAINING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 105 (1982)
(observing that "[d]ecentralization of authority is accepted as the key structural result of
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The desirability of venture autonomy increases in industries
characterized by volatile competition. Volatility demands speedy
reaction times and rapid decision-making, processes that are impeded by the necessity of coordinating with parents who intrude in
venture management.'
Transnational joint ventures confront several sources of competitive instability which will increase the desirability of venture autonomy. Changes in host-country foreign investment policies have occurred at alarming rates over the past five
years, both because of geo-political instability 74 and as a result
of a worldwide trend toward more open markets. 7 These unpredictable changes in public policy are a significant source of competitive volatility. Moreover, opportunities to enter new markets at
the development stage of the product life cycle attract an increasing
number of experienced competitors from highly developed economies who seek rejuvenation of products for which domestic markets have long been saturated. The growing number of businesses
with the capability to enter newly developed international markets
increases the uncertainty associated with global ventures. As a
result, venture autonomy and concomitant responsiveness and flexibility are becoming more important to a greater number of international collaborators.
Ideally, the parents of an international venture may seek the
benefits of autonomy while reducing the impact of its defects.
Contractual or planning tools such as limited parental vetoes can
be used to give operating control to an autonomous venture management team while retaining power over macro-level organizational decisions such as those regarding merger, sale, or acquisition of
assets.'76 This kind of arrangement maximizes the venture's authe need to cope with uncertainty from a given source," and that "[aluthority is diverted
to the points in the organization that are especially equipped to deal with that uncertainty").
172. Harrigan, supra note 48, at 156.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Matthew W. Sanidas, The Economic Evolution of Polish Joint Venture
Laws, 19 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 641, 642 (1991) (stating that Poland has undergone
"a profound political and social revolution" which will effect foreign investment possibilities in unforeseeable ways).
175. As an example, energy industry joint ventures in the Middle East became more
common in the 1980s as some Arab nations passed laws enabling greater freedom for collaborative activity. See, e.g., Saudi Foreign Capital Investment Code, Royal Decree No.
M.4, dated 2.2.1399 (Jan. 1, 1979) (creating incentives for foreign investment in Saudi
Arabia), reprinted in ALLEN P.K. KINSEE, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST:
SAUDI ARABIA (1981).
176. The veto might be limited, for example, to decisions made by venture management
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tonomy and resulting ability to respond to shifting opportunities
and threats, while maintaining parental supervision of ownership issues.
C.

Cultural Variation and Expectations of Joint Venturers

While cultural variation is an obvious consideration in allocating management responsibilities and in negotiating contract terms,
it is significant as well as a source of legal and contractual differences in the very conception of what a joint venture is and does.
Before parent companies commit themselves to a venture and attempt to address cultural challenges, they should ask a crucial
threshold question: what are our expectations of a joint venture,
and what are the expectations of our prospective collaborator, given
the differences in our countries' legal conceptions of the joint
venture form. Under Chinese law,"7 for example, international
joint ventures are authorized for the express benefit of the People's
' and liability may attach to strategic deciRepublic of China, 78
sions to utilize outdated equipment or technology 79' to begin the
process of opening a previously untapped market. 8 ° Whereas an

to shift ownership ratios through purchase and sale of shares, or issuance of new venture
shares.
177. For an unofficial translation of China's Joint Venture Law of 1979, see Law of the
People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, in
IKE MATHER & CHEN JAI-SHENG, STRATEGIES FOR JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 143, 143-60 (1987).
178. Id. at 144, art. 1 ("With a view to expanding international economic cooperation
and technological exchange, the People's Republic of China permits foreign companies,
enterprises, other economic entities, or individuals . . . to incorporate themselves, within
the territory of the People's Republic of China, into joint ventures with Chinese companies, enterprises, or other economic entities . . . on the principle of equality and mutual
benefit and subject to authorization by the Chinese government."). See also Richard E.
Pelosi, Jr., A Comparison of Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China and Japan,
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 95, 96-98 (1989) (discussing the Chinese
government's expectations of joint ventures).
179. MATHER & JAI-SHENG, supra note 177, at 148, art. 5 ("The technology or equipment contributed by any foreign participant as investment shall be truly advanced and appropriate to China's needs. In cases of losses caused by deception through the intentional
provision of outdated equipment or technology, compensation shall be paid for the losses.").
180. The use of outdated equipment in new overseas markets is a common practice of
American businesses, which retool domestically and are able to salvage old production
lines by using them in newly developing countries. From the perspective of the American
company, this practice is both efficient and socially responsible, since the old technology
is viewed as better than no technology at all. Developing countries may require the utilization of the latest production technologies and prohibit the adoption of outmoded processes by joint ventures, in an attempt to expedite industrial development.
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American company pursuing a joint venture in China may expect
to allow the developing marketplace to assess the viability and
profitability of the old technology, the Chinese co-venturer is more
likely to develop expectations consistent with Chinese law, viewing
the venture as an opportunity for the expedient transfer of the
latest technology."' For a growing number of American companies concerned with the protection of proprietary information and
technologies," China's insistence that ventures serve national

retooling functions may be unduly burdensome. An American coventurer that would restrict information transfer contractually in a

domestic setting may find liability for importing old technologies
into China prohibitive.'
Chinese joint venture law encompasses cultural expectations
that tend to be alien to American companies. The legal and cultural

conceptions of the function of a joint venture will vary among
other nations as well. If the venture is to be successful for American participants, they must understand such cultural differences

among nations' legal requirements and expectations of the joint
venture form."

181. International joint ventures are often established with American partners to achieve
the transfer of American technologies. Typically, the American parent finds the venture
desirable for a reason unrelated to the technology transfer, such as an entree into foreign
markets. In these kinds of ventures, issues of transfer pricing are common. See, e.g.,
MULTIATIONALS AND TRANSFER PRICING (Alan M. Rugman & Lorraine Eden eds., 1985)
(collection of essays discussing transfer pricing in the international context); PENELOPE J.
YUNKER, TRANSFER PRICING AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN MULTINATIONAL CoRPORATIONS: A SURVEY STUDY (1982) (studying transfer pricing in the context of multinational corporations).
182. For a discussion of the problems of high-technology international joint ventures
regarding the exchange and use of proprietary information, see Allan W. Vestal, "Ask Me
No Questions and I'll Tell You No Lies:" Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure Requirements Within High-Tech Joint Ventures, 65 TuL. L. REV. 705 (1991).
183. Because China insists upon exclusively cutting edge technology transfer, the parties
to a joint venture in China are limited in their ability to make contractual provisions for
more flexible arrangement, or for the protection against undesired information disclosure.
184. The differences in national expectations of international joint ventures, whether they
be the result of differences in culture, law, or both, are manifold. The example of Chinese expectations is only one of many. Other examples include variation in economic
beliefs incorporated into regulatory requirements. For instance, joint venture partners from
more protectionist economic cultures are more likely to adopt laws that require that manufacturing components meet "local content" requirements. Protectionist cultures will also
tend to be restrictive of imports and protective of technology transfer. For a discussion of
these considerations, see ENEN, supra note 93, at 55-59.
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CONCLUSION

International joint ventures confront a unique array of legal,
linguistic, and cultural challenges. While these considerations are
compelling throughout the process of managing the venture, they
are of special importance to the lawyers who are typically most
closely involved at the contracting stage.
While the observations I have made are based on close examination of a literature on international joint ventures which is becoming more substantial each year, numerous theoretical propositions contained in these pages are meant to provide social scientists
with the theoretical framework for empirical research. Meanwhile,
my suggestions are also intended to help practitioners who are
involved in the early stages of negotiation and contract drafting, as
they face the difficult challenges that arise when companies contemplate the establishment of transnational collaborative arrangements. Careful consideration of the legal, linguistic, and cultural
components of joint venturing should result in more effective endeavors which meet the needs of co-venturers as they evolve in
our increasingly volatile global business environments.

